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 26.1 Introduction 
 The defining goal of clinical research is to generate knowledge that can be used to enhance the 
therapeutic capacities and decision-making of clinicians and policymakers. Achieving this goal 
often requires experimenting on or collecting information about human subjects 1 in ways that 
would, without consent, infringe their rights. Guidelines for human subjects research, such as 
the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, the Belmont Report, and the Common 
Rule Regulations exist because of notorious studies that, among other things, failed to obtain 
voluntary and informed consent from human subjects. The Nazi doctors forced prisoners into 
harmful experiments (Claims Conference 2007). The Tuskegee Syphilis Study tricked subjects 
into accepting a painful non-therapeutic lumbar puncture under the guise of “special free treat-
ment” (Brandt 1978). Had the investigators in these experiments sought voluntary and informed 
consent, subjects would have refused and avoided serious harm. But protection from unwanted 
harm is not the only function of consent. In another much-discussed study, patients at the Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital were injected with live cancer cells for a purely scientific purpose, 
without being told that the injection was not for their benefit and that it contained live cancer 
cells (Arras 2008). The researchers argued that, since the injection posed no serious risk, the 
patients did not need to be informed about the contents or purpose of the injection to protect 
themselves from harm. Nevertheless, by injecting the patients without their informed consent, 
the researchers had clearly infringed on the patients’ rights to decide what is done to their bodies. 
 The lessons of these early scandals have been learned. The norm of obtaining voluntary and 
informed consent is now deeply entrenched in clinical research. Yet the topic of consent in 
clinical research remains a focus of discussion. There are two principal areas of continuing con-
troversy. One centers on the question of when consent to low-risk research is necessary and 
when it is not. It can be very costly or even infeasible to seek consent for certain types of 
studies, such as research on biological samples and emergency research. If consent is unnecessary 
in such studies this would be a boon to science, but there is disagreement about the conditions 
under which low-risk research may go forward without consent. 
 Another source of controversy derives from a worry that, even when consent is sought from 
subjects, the consent they provide is often defective. Consent should be adequately informed 
and voluntary. But empirical research has shown that subjects frequently have deficits in their 
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understanding of the studies they are participating in, especially those aspects that set research 
apart from the patient-centered settings they are accustomed to (Mandava 2012). Furthermore, 
researchers routinely offer money to healthy individuals and sometimes even to patients as an 
incentive to enroll in their studies. Many ethicists and institutional review board (IRB) members 
are concerned that these payments and other incentives such as free health care may be compro-
mising the voluntariness of the consent that researchers obtain. 
 This article begins with an overview of several types of clinical research that have sparked 
debates about the necessity of consent, followed by a brief discussion of the considerations 
relevant to resolving those debates. The focus will then turn to the question of what conditions 
must be satisfied for consent to be effective. This is the issue of the “validity conditions” for 
consent to research. The earliest and still most influential account of these conditions is 
non-moralized, in the sense that the validity conditions make no essential reference to whether 
the researcher soliciting consent from a subject has obtained it in a way that wrongs the subject 
or not. Recently new approaches that moralize some of these conditions have been put forward. 
As we’ll see, the non-moralized and moralized approaches to consent in research yield very 
different implications for how we should evaluate the use of payment and other incentives to 
increase enrollment and how troubled we should be by the data indicating that subjects often 
misunderstand various aspects of study design. 
 26.2 When is consent to research necessary? 
 Consent communicates an intention to make it the case that someone else would not wrong 
you by treating you in a certain way (Owens 2012: 165). That is, it purports to waive a right. 
When consent is “valid”, it successfully waives that right. When a researcher proposes to treat 
a subject in a way that would infringe a right without consent, then obviously consent is nec-
essary to avoid infringing that right. But if the researcher plans to involve the subject only in 
ways that would not wrong the subject without their consent, there are no rights that need to 
be waived. Since seeking consent can impede the progress of research, it is important to get 
clear on exactly what ways of involving a subject in research would infringe on their rights 
without their consent. 
 There are some types of clinical research that are routinely conducted without obtaining 
consent. Epidemiological research on medical records, for example, dispenses with consent. So 
long as confidentiality is protected, this practice is fairly uncontroversial (Miller 2010). This may 
be in part because this research does not include interventions on human subjects. But storing 
patients’ tissues or blood for research purposes (after they have been removed, with consent, for 
therapeutic reasons) does not intervene on the bodies of subjects themselves either, nor does 
any of the research that is subsequently conducted on those tissues. Yet many believe that storing 
those samples for research purposes requires consent, and some even argue that subjects must be 
re-consented for every study that is subsequently done on those samples, even though this 
would discourage valuable research (for discussion, see Grady 2015). 
 There is also clinical research that does intervene on the bodies of human subjects and yet 
proceeds without consent from the subject or even a surrogate. Emergency research randomizes 
subjects with acute and life-threatening illnesses between experimental and standard emergency 
care. This is sometimes done without their consent (and without the consent of a proxy) not 
only when consent would be impossible to obtain in time, but also when prospective consent 
would be possible but would greatly reduce the enrollment rate or lead to imbalanced enroll-
ment (Karlawish 2008). Randomized controlled trials comparing two approved and widely 
used treatments typically do seek consent to research from the subjects, but recently some 
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ethicists have argued that consent to the particular treatment they receive suffices and that 
consent to research is unnecessary (Faden et al. 2014). 
 At least three considerations are relevant to settling the question of whether consent to 
research must be obtained in a given study. The first is whether there are any rights that the 
research would infringe without consent. Do subjects have any rights against the use of their 
biological samples for research purposes, assuming there are already safeguards in place to pro-
tect them from embarrassing or harmful disclosures? If they do have privacy or perhaps property 
rights in relation to those samples, then the mere fact that the risks are very low would not be 
enough on its own to justify dispensing with consent. But if they do not, or if there are ways 
to work around those rights (e.g., by anonymizing the samples), there would be no need for 
consent. Regarding comparative effectiveness trials, do subjects have a right not to be experi-
mented upon that is distinct from their right not to be treated without consent? If they do then 
consent to research may be necessary (O’Neil 2014), but if not then consent to the particular 
treatment they receive would suffice. 
 When the research would infringe a right without consent, the second factor to consider is 
the strength of the right and the opportunity costs of seeking consent. Rights may sometimes 
be justifiably infringed. If the pertinent rights are weak, the fact that obtaining consent would 
slow important scientific progress could be enough to override them (Miller 2010). But whether 
this fact is indeed enough to override them may also depend on a third factor, namely, whether 
the justification treats subjects’ hypothetical consent as a constraint. Some justifications for dis-
pensing with consent procedures do not presuppose that anyone would refuse if asked. The 
reason for dispensing with consent is only that the process of seeking consent would require so 
much time and resources that the research would no longer be worthwhile. 2 But other justifi-
cations do presuppose that there would be high or imbalanced rates of refusal. Both kinds of 
justifications cite impediments to scientific progress, but they differ in their relation to hypo-
thetical consent. The former justification is consistent with recognizing hypothetical consent as 
a constraint on human subjects research. The legitimacy of the latter justification is highly 
questionable because it flouts that constraint. Not only does it anticipate that subjects would  not 
consent if asked, that is the very basis of the justification. 
 26.3 When is consent to research valid? 
 Once we are convinced that a study involves a subject in a way that would, without the subject’s 
or a surrogate’s consent, infringe a right, a new question arises. Under what conditions is consent 
effective in making it the case that the subject is not wronged by that involvement? Here it is 
important to distinguish between failures that are due to limits on the power of consent and 
failures that are due to defective consent. It may be the case that consent, no matter its quality, is 
incapable of cancelling duties to subjects not to expose them to serious risks of harm for a trivial 
reason (Tadros 2016: 265–80), to transact with them on terms that distribute the benefits fairly 
(Wertheimer 2011: 191–254), and to provide them with certain forms of ancillary care (Richardson 
2012: 133–43). 3 In what follows I set aside issues about the limits on the power of consent and 
ask only, when a right is waivable by consent, under what conditions is consent effective in 
waiving the right? This is the question of the “validity conditions” for consent to research. 
 26.4 Competent consent 
 One condition that must be met for an act of consent, on its own, to waive a right against an 
intervention is that the consenter be competent with respect to the decision: that is, possess 
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sufficient decision-making capacity to make the decision. Decision-making capacity is the 
capacity to make a decision that best reflects one’s values. This capacity calls on both cogni-
tive abilities to form a judgment about what one ought to do in light of the facts, and voli-
tional abilities to form, maintain, and execute an intention that reflects that judgment. Young 
children are regarded as incompetent to waive their rights against involvement in research. 
Adults who suffer from advanced dementia may have cognitive impairments that render 
them incompetent to consent to research, and adults suffering from severe depression or 
addiction may have volitional impairments that render them incompetent to consent to cer-
tain kinds of research. Findings of incompetence are relative to the decision being made. 
Arguably an adult who has sufficient capacity to make a decision about treatment may not 
have sufficient capacity to make a similarly complex decision about research, if they are inca-
pable of appreciating the relevant differences between clinical care and research (Rosenstein & 
Miller 2008). 
 What is the upshot of a determination of incompetence? Although the Nuremberg Code 
appears to rule out experimenting on anyone who is incompetent to consent to research, 
current guidelines and regulations permit some experimentation on incompetent subjects, so 
long as consent is obtained from a surrogate. Also, although incompetent subjects cannot by 
themselves effectively waive their rights against experimentation, they retain, at least when they 
are considered sufficiently capable of exercising it, veto power. (The bar for this capacity is 
lower than for competence.) The surrogate’s consent is usually treated as waiving the subject’s 
rights only so long as the subject also “assents”. 
 The reliance on surrogate consent is a feature of both clinical practice and research. But 
there is one very striking difference. In clinical practice, apart from exceptional cases such as 
kidney donations, it is never justifiable to impose net risks on a patient for the benefit of 
others. But research that imposes risks without an expectation of greater benefit for the sub-
ject is conducted not only on subjects capable of consenting to it, but also on incompetent 
subjects when their surrogate consents. Patients who were previously competent may have 
expressed a wish when they were competent to make such a sacrifice after they lose compe-
tence. Involving them in such a study seems unobjectionable since it accords with their 
earlier competent wishes, so long as they do not now dissent. But this kind of justification 
cannot be extended to young children who have never been competent. Permitting children 
to be exposed to minor research risks for the benefit of other children is relatively uncontro-
versial in practice. But at the level of justification, it remains puzzling how parental consent 
could not only waive parental rights against researchers experimenting on their child, but 
also the child’s own right against being exposed to risks for the benefit of others (Ramsey 
1976; Wendler 2010). 
 26.5 Voluntary consent 
 Even when a subject is competent to consent to a research intervention, their consent will be 
invalid if it is involuntary. Mrs. M, a survivor of experiments that took place at Auschwitz, 
reports that she agreed to be experimented on by Dr. Mengele only because “As soon as I stood 
up I was whipped with a leather whip which broke my flesh, then I was told the whipping was 
a sample of what I would receive if I did not follow instructions and orders” (Claims Conference 
2007). Obviously Mrs. M’s consent to Mengele’s injecting her with drugs and other chemicals 
did not make it the case she was not wronged by it. 
 Beyond this uncontroversial sort of case, however, much is in dispute. Some ethicists see 
involuntariness exemplified in the cases below 4 ; others do not. 
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(1)  very poor or homeless subjects that consent to research in order to receive a substantial 
payment; 
(2)  subjects that are uninsured or under-insured and that consent to research in order to receive 
health care; 
(3)  prisoners that consent to research to obtain spending money or better conditions or sen-
tence reductions; 
(4)  subjects that consent to research because an authority figure in their lives wishes it; 
(5)  drug addicts that consent to research that involves giving addicts their drug of choice. 
 One disagreement about voluntariness is just terminological, although if it is not sorted out it 
can lead to confusion. Everyone agrees that consent may be rendered invalid because of the way 
the external situation in which the subject chooses is altered, as in Mrs. M’s case. Everyone also 
agrees that consent can be rendered invalid because of the way the subject’s ability to recognize 
or respond to his or her external situation is impaired, as in cases involving the use of deception 
or temptation. Some authors (Beauchamp 2010; Nelson et al. 2011) prefer a broad conception 
of “voluntariness” that covers both types of invalidating conditions, whereas others (Appelbaum 
et al. 2009; Wertheimer 2012) reserve the label for conditions that invalidate because of the way 
they alter the subject’s external situation (see also Gutmann, this volume,  Chapter 19 ). In what 
follows I will adopt the narrower use of “voluntariness” that confines it to the external situation 
and discuss the other type of invalidating condition under the label “impairment”. Since ethi-
cists that regard the drug addict example (5) above as displaying involuntariness presumably 
have impairment in mind, we can dismiss it at the outset. 
 26.6 The autonomous authorization approach to voluntariness 
 With this terminological dispute out of the way, we can focus on the substantive disagreement, 
which concerns the facts about a subject’s external situation that could render their consent 
involuntary. According to the standard approach in research ethics, the autonomous authorization 
(AA) approach, a subject’s consent is involuntary when it is “substantially controlled” by 
changes someone else has made to their external situation (Faden et al. 1986; Beauchamp 2010; 
Nelson et al. 2011). Put another way, whether consent is involuntary depends on the  degree of 
pressure to consent that is brought to bear on their decision by the exercise of someone else’s 
control over their situation. I’ll describe the AA approach to involuntariness first, and then 
introduce a recent competing view. These two views deliver different verdicts about the 
consent in cases (1)–(4) above. 
 In Mrs. M’s case, the pressure to consent derived from the removal of an option she would 
have preferred, namely, the option of not participating in research and avoiding a whipping. 
Following the Belmont Report, advocates of the AA approach tend to label pressure that results 
from removing more attractive options, as in Mrs. M’s case, as potentially “coercive” and pres-
sure that results just from creating more attractive options, like the option of participating in 
research and making money, receiving access to health care, or other benefits, as potentially 
“undue inducement”. (However, some ethicists (Macklin 1989) and many IRB members 
(Largent et al. 2012) call pressure from both sources “coercive”.) But the AA approach to 
voluntariness is, ultimately, indifferent to whether the pressure to consent derives from the 
removal of a more preferable option or just from the creation of a preferable option. At the end 
of the day, voluntariness is a matter of whether the pressure, no matter its source, is excessive. 
 When is pressure excessive? According to some adherents of the AA approach, including 
many IRB members (Largent et al. 2012), an offer of payment or other benefits exerts excessive 
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pressure whenever it induces a subject to participate in research. This is a puzzling view, since 
normally the fact that someone accepts risks to make money is not taken to impugn the vol-
untariness of their acceptance. What lies behind it, presumably, is Hans Jonas’s influential idea 
that participation in clinical research ought to be intrinsically motivated. Jonas (1969) regards 
subjects as having been “conscripted” into a study unless they consent to it for the same rea-
son the researcher conducts it, namely, because they identify with the goals of the research. 
Jonas’s view has had a major influence on the way IRBs think about payment for research 
participation. But it is far from clear why we should treat extrinsically motivated consent to 
research as involuntary when we treat extrinsically motivated consent to other risky jobs as 
voluntary. 
 A less demanding version of the AA approach claims that an incentive is excessive when it 
leaves the subject with no  reasonable alternative but to consent. Notice however that a subject 
might have no reasonable alternative to participation, not because their status quo is so bad, but 
only because the benefits of participation are so good. Consider a subject who is financially 
secure and consents to a risky study in order to receive a payment that vastly exceeds the 
amount necessary to compensate for the risks. Recall that we are assuming that the subject’s 
consent in these cases is clear-headed. That is, the incentive is not distorting the subject’s ability 
to recognize or respond to their situation, e.g., by blinding the subject to the risks or tempting 
the subject to accept them against their better judgment. So long as that assumption is kept 
firmly in mind, it is hard to believe that offering someone who is financially secure substantially 
more than their reservation price would invalidate their consent. 
 The AA approach can avoid this problem by treating pressure as excessive only when the 
subject’s alternatives are  unacceptable. Financially secure subjects who consent to a risky study 
offering an extremely generous payment may have no reasonable alternative but to consent, but 
their status quo is acceptable. A homeless person in need of money or an uninsured person in 
need of health care, on the other hand, may consent to a study offering payment or health care 
only because their alternatives are unacceptable. Their consent would still be involuntary, 
according to this version of the AA approach. 
 Is this plausible, keeping in mind the assumption that the incentive is not distorting their 
practical reasoning? A desperate subject may feel forced to consent to a study offering payment 
or health care by the lack of acceptable alternatives. But a cancer patient also accepts the risks 
of chemotherapy only because the alternative, certain death, is unacceptable. Surely the cancer 
patient’s consent to chemotherapy is not rendered involuntary by the absence of acceptable 
alternatives? Granted, there is a difference between the risks of chemotherapy and the risks of 
research: whereas the benefits of chemotherapy are not detachable from its risks, a researcher 
could offer money or health care without requiring research participation. But if the researcher 
does not owe the subject the money or health care without any strings attached, why would 
conditioning these benefits on research participation render the subject’s consent invalid, any 
more than conditioning the provision of chemotherapy on receipt of payment would render 
the patient’s consent invalid? 
 26.7 The moralized approach to voluntariness 
 According to the competing approach to voluntariness, what is invalidating about the circum-
stances of Mrs. M’s consent is not that she had no acceptable alternative to consenting, but that 
the reason she had no acceptable alternative is because the researcher had  wrongfully removed an 
option that she would have preferred, namely, the option of refusing participation and not 
suffering a whipping. Mrs. M has a right against being whipped that is not conditional on her 
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choice about participating in research. Such an account of voluntariness is  moralized (Wertheimer 
2012). Consent to research is involuntary, according to this kind of approach, when and only 
when it is caused by the wrongful removal of or refusal to create an option that the subject 
would have preferred. Creating an option for a subject can never render their consent 
involuntary, since adding an option cannot wrong the subject, although their consent to that 
new option will be involuntary if it is a product of the wrongful removal or refusal to create an 
option they would have preferred. 
 Mrs. M illustrates how consent can be rendered involuntary by wrongfully removing an 
option from the subject. Consent is also rendered involuntary when it is prompted by a wrongful 
failure to create or sustain an option the consenter would have preferred. It is wrong for a phy-
sician to abandon a patient. Suppose that a physician decides to motivate her patient to enroll 
in a study she is conducting by threatening to stop treating him if he refuses. If the patient 
consents to the study only because of the physician’s threat to discontinue an option that he is 
owed, namely, the option of continuing the physician–patient relationship without participating 
in the study, then the patient’s consent to the study is involuntary. 
 Whereas the AA approach implies that consent to research that responds to payment is 
involuntary when the payment is too high or when the subject’s need for money is too severe, 
the moralized approach never implies that an offer of money renders consent involuntary. The 
payment may help to make it the case that the subject has no reasonable alternative or no 
acceptable alternative but to consent, but this does not make the consent involuntary. How-
ever, the subject’s consent to a study that offers payment would be involuntary if it was caused 
by a wrongful denial of a preferable option. Suppose that a researcher promises a subject that 
they will receive $100 for each stage of a four-stage study that they complete. The subject 
completes the first two stages, and then decides to withdraw. If, in order to incentivize the 
subject to complete all four stages, the researcher goes back on the promise and decides that 
the subject will be given $400 only if he completes the two remaining stages and nothing if he 
drops out now, then the subject’s consent to the remaining stages of the study would count as 
involuntary. It is not the attractiveness of the $400 for completing the remaining stages that 
makes it involuntary, however. Rather, it is the fact that the subject is consenting to the 
remaining stages only because the subject was wrongfully denied his preferred option, namely, 
stopping after two stages and receiving $200 as promised. 5 
 When it comes to the incentive of health care, again, the moralized view will deny that it is 
ever the offer of health care in itself that renders consent involuntary, since the offer just creates 
an option and the creation of an option cannot wrong the subject. However, the moralized 
view does imply that if the subject’s consent to research is a product of the researcher’s wrongful 
failure to offer a health care option that the subject would have preferred, then it will be 
involuntary. A public hospital may owe treatment to patients without strings attached. If it 
makes participation in a randomized controlled trial a condition on delivery of treatment, the 
subjects’ consent would be involuntary if it is prompted by the hospital’s wrongful refusal to 
offer treatment without research participation. But institutions such as the NIH or private 
hospitals that do not owe potential subjects treatment outside the context of research can make 
participation in a trial a condition on delivery of treatment without rendering subjects’ consent 
to the research involuntary (Fried 2016: 43–7). And even public hospitals do not owe patients 
access to  experimental therapies. Suppose that experimental therapy is offered to a patient but 
only on the condition that they enroll in the clinical trial that is evaluating it. If the therapy 
offers the subject their last best hope for survival, there would be tremendous pressure on the 
subject to consent. The subject may much prefer the option of receiving the therapy outside 
the trial, especially if the trial is placebo-controlled. But insofar as the subject is not owed that 
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therapy outside the context of a trial, the subject’s consent to the study is not based on the 
wrongful denial of an option they would have preferred (cf. Schuklenk & Lowry 2009). 
 It should now be clear how the moralized approach would handle the case of prison research. 
If the institution incentivized prisoners to consent to research by threatening to otherwise 
extend their sentence or remove privileges they had earned, then the prisoner’s consent would 
be involuntary, so long as it was caused by the denial of these options. But if instead the insti-
tution offered a reduction in the prisoner’s sentence or privileges they were not already entitled 
to, then the prisoner’s consent to the study would be voluntary, since it is not prompted by a 
removal or denial of an option the prisoner is entitled to. 
 But suppose the details of the prison research are as follows. The researcher comes in from 
the outside and seeks volunteers. The researcher has no problem enrolling subjects, but it turns 
out this is because prison staff (acting on their own and not at the direction of the research team) 
are threatening to make life worse for prisoners who refuse to sign up. Is their consent still 
voluntary? A similar concern might lie behind the case of the subject who consents to research 
under the influence of an authority figure, such as a husband or a tribal leader. This raises an 
issue about the significance of third-party coercion. On the moralized approach as I’ve described 
it, consent to research is involuntary only when it is the product of the  researcher’s wronging of 
the subject (Miller & Wertheimer 2010). (Note that researchers may sometimes have duties to 
relieve third-party pressure on subjects, and if the subject consents to the study only because the 
researcher fails to discharge such a duty, the consent would be involuntary.) 6 The AA approach 
would not differentiate these cases, since the degree of pressure applied is the same. But there 
are other versions of a moralized approach that do claim that at least illegitimate third-party 
coercion can render a subject’s consent to the researcher’s intervention involuntary even in the 
absence of any wronging by the researcher (Millum 2014). 
 26.8 Informed (unimpaired) consent 
 At the beginning of the previous section I distinguished between consent that is invalid because 
it is involuntary and consent that is invalid because it is impaired. Certain ways of controlling 
the external situation in which the subject chooses can render consent involuntary. Impaired 
consent occurs when the subject’s ability to recognize and respond to their external situation is 
distorted. There are a variety of ways in which a researcher could, intentionally or negligently, 
interfere with a subject’s practical reasoning about whether to participate in a study. Although 
attaching rewards to participation, like payment or health care, cannot as such render consent 
involuntary, it may interfere with the exercise of subjects’ cognitive capacities by blinding them 
to the risks of the study or their volitional capacities by tempting them into consenting against 
their better judgment (Wertheimer 2011: 150). 7 Similarly, the fact that an addict’s drug of 
choice is administered in the study, though not intended as an inducement, could interfere with 
the exercise of the addict’s volitional capacities. (See Walker (2008) for a strategy to obtain 
consent from addicts that circumvents this problem.) Even making use of the fact that subjects 
have a hard time saying no to doctors – the so-called “white-coat effect” – could impair the 
subject’s practical reasoning by injecting an irrelevant consideration into their deliberations 
(Mandava & Millum 2013). 
 Attention to the varieties of impairments and the question of when they invalidate consent 
is an important research program in research ethics (Mandava & Millum 2013; see Faden et al. 
(1986) for an early treatment). In this section, however, I will focus on the question that has 
received the bulk of the attention in the literature on consent, namely, the question of when 
consent is adequately informed (See also Eyal, this volume,  Chapter 24 ). The autonomous 
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authorization (AA) approach embodies the standard answer to this question. But as in the case 
of voluntariness, the AA approach has come under criticism and competing approaches have 
been proposed. I will describe these approaches, and draw out their implications concerning 
the question of whether so-called “therapeutic misconceptions” and other misconceptions 
invalidate consent. 
 There is broad agreement that clinical researchers are under duties to disclose extensive 
information about the study to potential subjects, e.g., about the purpose of the study, what will 
be done to the subjects, the risks and benefits of the interventions, and appropriate alternatives 
to participation. In many other contexts in which consent is sought, such as commerce, jobs, 
sex, and gambling, there is at most a duty not to deceive, or when there are duties to disclose 
information, they are very modest (Miller & Wertheimer 2010). In clinical care, however, we 
traditionally regard clinicians as under a duty to make an extensive disclosure to patients, since 
it is so hard for patients to learn the relevant facts on their own and relatively easy for the clini-
cians, who should already know these facts, to disclose them. The same asymmetry applies to 
researchers and subjects. Indeed, since the primary aim of clinical research is not to benefit the 
subject but to advance knowledge, researchers are usually regarded as having even more exten-
sive duties of disclosure than clinicians. Since clinicians can be presumed to be acting solely in 
the patients’ best interests, patients arguably have less need for information from their clinicians 
than potential subjects do from researchers (Chwang 2010). 
 There is a question about the exact content of the extensive duty of disclosure, e.g., whether 
it is governed by the professional practice standard, reasonable person standard, or a standard 
more tailored to each individual subject (Brock 2008). I will assume, for simplicity, that the 
content of the duty of disclosure is to disclose to the subject all of the facts about the study 
interventions that the researcher knows or ought to know would be material to the subject’s 
decision. These facts should also be disclosed in a manner that makes them accessible to the 
subject. Describing the injection in Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital as containing “live neo-
plastic cells” would not satisfy the duty of disclosure. But the duty of disclosure is only a duty 
to  try to inform the subject, i.e., to give the subject a fair opportunity to become adequately 
informed. It is not a duty to succeed. Thus it is possible for a researcher to fully comply with 
their duty of disclosure while the subject remains ignorant of or mistaken about material facts. 
This raises the question of whether consent based on ignorance or mistake could be valid, so 
long as it is not attributable to a failure to fully discharge the duty of disclosure. 
 26.9 The autonomous authorization approach to informed consent 
 Although there is broad agreement about the duty of disclosure, important disagreements 
emerge when we consider different views about the  relation between compliance with the duty 
of disclosure and the conditions under which ignorance or mistaken beliefs undermine the 
validity of consent. According to the standard view of informed consent, the autonomous 
authorization (AA) view, consent is valid only when all of the information about an interven-
tion that is material to the subject’s decision to consent is actually understood by the subject 
(Faden et al. 1986; Beauchamp 2010). 8 If it were the case that disclosures invariably brought 
about the corresponding understanding in subjects, then the question of whether this under-
standing is truly necessary for valid consent would be of merely academic interest. But it turns 
out that, even after scrupulous disclosures, subjects frequently misunderstand material facts 
about study interventions and procedures. 
 One particularly recalcitrant type of misunderstanding is known as the “therapeutic miscon-
ception” (Appelbaum & Lidz 2008). The defining goal of clinical research is to generate 
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clinically useful information, not to benefit the subjects of that research. In order to achieve this 
goal, clinical research frequently involves departures from the individualized care one would 
expect in a clinical setting. Even when this different purpose and the differences between the 
design of the study and clinical care are disclosed, subjects frequently continue to expect indi-
vidualized care in the research setting. For example, they may continue to believe that their 
treatment will not be selected by a random process, that they would never be given a placebo, 
that any burdensome or risky intervention must be intended for their direct benefit, and so on. 
These departures from clinical care will often be material to the subject’s decision to consent, 
at least when the alternative to receiving the therapy in the context of the study is receiving it 
in clinical practice. Yet these misunderstandings are highly resistant to disclosure. 
 The AA approach takes the fact that subjects are under a therapeutic misconception as 
having a straightforward implication for the validity of their consent. Insofar as the subjects are 
ignorant of or misinformed about material aspects of the study, their consent is invalid, no 
matter how careful the disclosure was. Given the data about the prevalence of therapeutic mis-
conceptions (Mandava et al. 2012), this in turn implies the rather alarming conclusion that 
researchers have for years been engaged in the wholesale violation of their subjects’ rights. 
Possibly this conclusion is so implausible as to be reason enough to reject the theory that implies 
it. But even if not, there is still a powerful reason to rethink the AA theory. Notice that if 
researchers enhance the disclosures in light of this data, as they should given that the goal of 
these disclosures is to bring about understanding, there are no measures they could take that 
would  guarantee that subjects are adequately informed. Surely at some point the responsibility 
for the mistake must belong to the subject, not the researcher. Yet the AA approach does not 
make any room for this moral possibility. 
 26.10 The minimal understanding approach 
 Three alternative approaches to the question of when ignorance or mistake on the part of the 
subject invalidates their consent have recently emerged. Each approach accepts that researchers 
have an extensive duty of disclosure and that at least a “minimal” understanding of a research 
intervention is necessary to validly consent to it. Unlike the AA approach, none of these alter-
natives imply that ignorance or mistake about any material fact undermines the validity of the 
subject’s consent. But they differ as to the conditions under which ignorance or mistake does 
render a subject’s consent invalid. 
 One kind of approach takes the minimal understanding of an intervention as not only 
necessary for validity, but also sufficient. A failure to discharge the full duty of disclosure would 
still wrong the subject, but it would not have the effect of rendering the subject’s consent 
invalid unless as a consequence the subject lacked a minimal understanding of the intervention. 
What counts as minimal understanding? On the most fully developed version of this approach 
(Walker 2012; see Sreenivasan 2003 for an earlier version), consenting to a researcher’s doing 
X requires at a minimum that the subject understand all the descriptions of X under which 
doing X would, without consent, infringe a right of the subject’s. The fact that X would 
involve bodily contact or invasion is a morally relevant description. So is the fact that it imposes 
a risk of harm, although only if the level of risk is such that the subject would, independently 
of the bodily contact, have a right against being exposed to it. 
 This “minimal understanding” approach is very liberal about ignorance and mistakes con-
cerning research. It seems likely that, on this account, many of the common misunderstandings 
subjects have about research would not compromise the validity of their consent. But it is in 
danger of being too liberal about misunderstandings. Suppose that a researcher is seeking a 
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subject’s consent to a placebo-controlled randomized trial, which gives her only a 50% chance 
of receiving the treatment she needs and that also involves painful non-therapeutic biopsies. In 
fact, the treatment she needs is readily available outside the trial and if she knew this she would 
never consent to the trial. The researcher purposefully withholds this crucial information from 
her. Surely the subject is wronged by the biopsies. But on the minimalist approach, she appears 
to possess the minimal understanding needed to validly consent to the biopsies. The fact that 
the treatment she needs is available outside the trial is not a description of the biopsy at all, much 
less a description of it under which it would wrong her without her consent. 
 26.11 The partially moralized approach 
 The next two approaches do not regard a minimal understanding of the intervention as suffi-
cient for valid consent (Bromwich & Millum 2013; Miller & Wertheimer 2010). Unlike the 
AA approach, however, these theories do not imply that ignorance of  any material fact about 
the intervention invalidates consent. Ignorance of a material fact renders the subject’s consent 
invalid only if the ignorance is attributable to the researcher’s failure to discharge the duty of 
disclosure. Regarding the case above, both views would regard the subject’s ignorance of the 
availability of treatment outside the trial as invalidating, because this ignorance is due to the 
researcher’s withholding that information in violation of their duty of disclosure. But if 
the researcher had disclosed this information in a manner that satisfied this duty and the subject 
still failed to grasp it, the subject’s consent would not necessarily be invalidated. 
 Moralized theories of validity can be compellingly motivated by the following pair of cases 
(Bromwich & Millum 2013: 7–8). In the first case, a researcher is aware that the drug she is test-
ing has side-effects A and B and discloses both side-effects to the subjects. It is later discovered 
that the drug also has side-effect C, although no one in the expert community, including the 
researcher, knew it at the time. Although the subjects are consenting to the drug in ignorance of 
the material fact that it has side-effect C, their consent seems valid. In the next case, the same 
researcher, after learning that the drug has side-effect C, initiates another study. She discloses 
side-effects A and B to the subjects, but withholds what she now knows about side-effect C from 
them. These new subjects are consenting to the drug in ignorance of the material information 
about C, just like the previous subjects, but their consent seems clearly invalid. Yet both groups 
of subjects have the same understanding of the same intervention in both cases. 
 A plausible explanation for the difference in validity is that the subjects’ ignorance of C in 
the first case is not attributable to the researcher’s failure to discharge their duty of disclosure, 
whereas the subjects’ ignorance in the second case is. On Bromwich’s and Millum’s view, 
however, it turns out that only a subclass of the violations of the duty of disclosure can invali-
date consent. Returning to the first case, suppose that side-effect C was well known in the 
expert community and that the researcher should have known about it, but failed to keep up 
with the literature. When she fails to disclose C to the subjects, she is in violation of the duty 
of disclosure, since this is not merely a duty to disclose what one does know, but what one 
should know. But they claim that when the failure to discharge the duty is due to ignorance, 
no matter how negligent, it cannot invalidate consent because it cannot count as an exercise of 
illegitimate  control over the subject’s practical deliberations (Bromwich & Millum 2013: 13). 
 This account, like the minimal understanding account just discussed, is in danger of being 
too liberal. Consider a Phase I oncology trial, in which the researcher sincerely tells a cancer 
patient that the drug has a small but real prospect of arresting the progress of his cancer. In fact, 
however, patients are to be given only a subtherapeutic dose of the drug in this trial, something 
the researcher does not know but certainly should have known. In this case, the researcher is 
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not merely failing to disclose something important to the patient, but is  misinforming the patient 
about something that would have changed the patient’s mind about consenting. Yet, on this 
approach, this failure to discharge the duty of disclosure would still not invalidate the patient’s 
consent to the trial, because the researcher does not know that she is misinforming the patient, 
and is therefore not exercising illegitimate control over the subject’s decision-making. 
 26.12 The fully moralized approach 
 If the consent in the oncology case seems invalid, this is a reason to prefer a fully moralized account 
of validity, like that on offer in Miller & Wertheimer (2010) and Owens (2007). On such an 
account,  any failure to discharge the duties of disclosure that results in ignorance of a material fact 
about the intervention would invalidate consent. This account would imply that the consent in 
the oncology case is invalid. Although the researcher did not know she was failing to discharge her 
duties of disclosure, she was. And since the subject’s mistaken belief was due to this failure, the 
subject’s consent, which was based on that mistaken belief, is invalid. The fully moralized account 
seems to be able to capture all the cases where, intuitively, consent is invalid, yet without implying, 
as the AA approach does, that each and every material misunderstanding invalidates consent. 9 
 Notes 
 1 I use the term “subject” rather than “participant” because the topic of consent is the topic of what is 
needed to turn a mere subject into a participant. 
 2 Studies that use deception for certain methodological reasons can also be consistent with respect for 
subjects’ hypothetical consent (O’Neil 2013). 
 3 The claim that subjects cannot release researchers from certain duties directed  towards them is stronger 
than the uncontroversial claim that consenting to X does not always make X permissible, all things 
considered. E.g., subjects’ consent to involvement in a study lacking social value does not release 
publicly funded researchers from their duty to the taxpayers not to waste resources. 
 4 These examples are drawn from Appelbaum et al. (2009). These authors are skeptical that (1)–(5) 
display involuntariness, but see their article for citations of the literature that views (1)–(5) as examples 
of involuntariness. 
 5 Suppose that, rather than offering $400 for finishing the study, the research ups the offer to $10,000, 
but still denies the subject the promised option of receiving $200 after completing two stages. If the 
subject would prefer to continue the study and receive $10,000 rather than stop now and receive the 
$200 he is owed, then the consent is not involuntary. Although the subject is wrongfully denied 
the option of receiving $200 now, the subject’s consent to continue on with the study is not  caused by 
the denial of that option. I.e., the subject would have consented to continue the study even if the 
option owed the subject had been available. 
 6 I owe this observation to Yulia Gamper. 
 7 Interestingly, there is evidence that the higher the payment, the more attentive subjects become to the 
risks of the study (Cryder et al. 2010). 
 8 They do recognize some exceptions, such as “open withholding” (Faden et al. 1986: 312–3). 
 9 I am grateful to Marcello DiBello, Andreas Muller, and Peter Schaber for helpful written comments, 
and to the participants in my Research Ethics seminar at the Center for Bioethics, NYU, Summer 
2017, for valuable discussion. 
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